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ABSTRACT 
Pointing to a radical concept of  'self-givingness' and self-transcendence, Plato’s notion of  good 
offers a valuable means for delineating a realism which eliminates any dichotomy between 
subjectivity and objectivity, knowledge and morality, ethics and ontology. Plato's suggestions 
can be discovered in combining the characterization of  the Demiurge given in the Timaeus with 
the analogy between the supreme Good and the sun presented in the Republic, as well as 
explicating the analogy between the Good and the sun with reference to the image of  the 
intelligible sphere of  light. The resulting notion of  good could be integrated into the 
phenomenal dimension of  our knowledge and perception, helping to illustrate the reality of  the 
way that knowledge and perception transcend any separation between interiority and 
exteriority, self  and world, individuality and community.  
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1. Integrating the self  with the world  
 
Any reflection concerning moral realism could be unsatisfactory if  it concentrates 
solely on the notion either of  objectivity or of  transcendence. In the following 
discussion I will suggest the possibility of  developing a moral realism which avoids 
such univocal connotation. This possibility will be indicated through focusing on 
one of  the most essential notions in any moral discourse: on the notion of  good. 
My thesis is based on two seminal passages from Plato’s works – Timaeus 29e-30a 
and Respublica 506d6-509c. I will reflect on the possibility of  configuring a notion 
of  good which integrates in itself  universality/objectivity as well as 
individuality/subjectivity, immanence as well as transcendence1. In other words, 
                                                 
* The term agathological does here not primarily refer to the domain of  ethics or practical 
philosophy, but rather to a thinking which, transcending any separation of  practical from 
theoretical domains, perceives a supreme Good (agathon) as both ultimate origin and reason 
(logos) of  its autonomous activity as well as of  being in general. Realism, in turn, intends here 
simply to indicate an ontological consistency independent from the relation with a perceiving or 
knowing person.  
1 My argument as it follows is not necessarily best understood as an attempt to give an 
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the intended notion of  good should refer not only to a telos originally perceived as 
external, as purely objective and transcendent in relation to the knowing and 
acting self  – that is to individual, personal consciousness, – but also to a reality 
which can be immediately experienced by the self  as belonging to its own 
authentic nature as well as to its acting as a knowing person.  
Concentrating on Plato and evidencing the importance of  his suggestions, I 
will be expressing not merely archeological, but primarily heuristic concerns, 
attempting to indicate a perspective in which realism is capable of  being genuinely 
realist not only with regard to the world or to the so-called moral facts experienced 
by the self, but also with reference to the self, that is, to the consciousness and self-
consciousness experiencing itself  and the world,2 as well as to the conscience 
making moral choices in the world. This form of  realism is able to counter two 
possible criticisms made of  realism., On the one hand, realism is accused of  
problematically affirming the objective reality of  an outer world – that is of  a 
transcendent being – founding moral facts.On the other hand, realism is accused 
of  overlooking the profound evidence concerning the reality and uniqueness of  a 
person’s inner life and self  – ignoring, for instance, the epistemically unconfutable 
transparency of  self-consciousness3. The variety of  realism that I propose is able, I 
claim, to answer to both this critiques.  
Certainly, many responses to the aforementioned reproaches can be given. 
They could either be oriented towards naturalistic positions willing to eliminate 
the self  by considering it an illusion emerging from biological processes or social 
contexts; or they could result in the assumption of  spiritual perspectives 
absorbing the professed autonomous reality of  the self  in the dazzling light of  an 
undifferentiated Absolute or One. In both cases, however, realism would be 
inevitably compelled to postulate an insurmountable chasm, a dualism between 
being and consciousness, objectivity and subjectivity, self  and world. I am not 
                                                                                                                                                                  
exposition of  Plato’s moral realism. For a valuable and stimulating exposition of  this subject 
see Rist 2012. However, differently from Rist, I regard chronological concerns as not relevant 
for my considerations. According to the crucial (and reliable) testimony of  Dionys. Halicarn. de 
comp. verb. 25.32-33, Plato reconsidered and revised his works throughout his life, which makes 
impossible any trustworthy hypothesis concerning their chronology. Additionally, in 
contradistinction to Rist – who does not exploit the possibility of  integrating Respublica 506d6-
509c with Timaeus 29e-30a (Rist 2012, 142-146) – my primary concern will consist in 
emphasizing the self-givingness of  the Good rather then its connotation as telos, thus liberating 
Plato’s moral realism from the univocal objectivistic nuance characterizing its current 
expositions.  
2 A valuable attempt at delineating a realist approach with regard to consciousness and 
subjectivity can be found in Nagel 2012, although Nagel perceives his attempt as immanent to a 
naturalistic, while non-materialist, perspective, which differentiates his approach from that 
presented in the following discussion.  
3 This unconfutability is affirmed also in the context of  eliminativistic positions. See the 
exemplary disquisition contained in Metzinger 2003 (with further bibliography). 
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convinced that such form of  realism would be able, ultimately, to authentically 
harmonize with the aspirations which orient the majority of  persons living at the 
present time. This explains my interest for realistic positions which, in the field of  
both metaphysics and practical philosophy, do not assume the aforesaid gap as the 
ultimate destiny of  mankind. Among these positions Plato’s perspective may be 
regarded as paradigmatic. It is in fact focused on a notion of  good which, 
transcending any separation or dualism between ontology and ethics, could offer 
significant impulses towards a moral realism leading to the experience of  
reciprocal integration between being (world) and consciousness (self). 
 
 
2. Plato’s notion of  good. Good as unrestricted self-givingness and self-transcendence  
 
Plato delineates explicitly the nature of  being good only in Timaeus 29e-30a4, a 
passage illustrating the cause of  the Demiurge's impulse to produce the physical 
universe. According to this passage this cause consisted in the goodness of  the 
Demiurge, where being good is intimately connected with being aphthonos 
(Timaeus 29e1-2)5: being good involves being absolutely free from envy and, 
therefore, inclination to the highest form of  generosity, which disposes for an 
unrestricted self-givingness. Unrestricted self-givingness is, more precisely, the 
motivation by which the Demiurge gave life and form to our cosmos: the 
Demiurge was willing to render everything as similar to himself  as possible, that 
is, to render it good (Timaeus 29e2-3, 30a2). In brief, on the basis of  his goodness 
the Demiurge was willing to unrestrictedly endow another being with the most 
essential quality characterizing his own nature. In summary: he was willing to 
originate an image – an eikôn, that is something which is similar (eoike) to its own 
origin – of  himself  (see Timaeus 92c7).  
In the light of  the above passage the good consists in an unconditional 
impulse to self-manifestation, through which the good being shapes a ground for 
the existence and manifestation of  another good being, that is for an image of  
itself6. The unconditionality characterizing this impulse is demonstrated through 
the fact that the activity of  the Demiurge is absolutely free and autonomous, 
therefore not determined by any factor: neither by any need or necessity, nor by 
                                                 
4 I attempted a more general account of  the implications contained in Plato’s notion of  good in 
Lavecchia 2010 and Lavecchia 2012, 12-31. The scantiness or absence of  references to other 
interpreters of  Plato in the following pages is due to the fact that the implications intended here 
have until now not been adequately evidenced and investigated.  
5 The intimate association between being good and being aphtonos is very well emphasized in 
Milobenski 1964, 27-58, although Milobenski does not investigate the important implications 
that can be derived from it with regard to Plato’s notion of  good. 
6 For the positive connotations Plato associates with the notion of  image (eikôn), with special 
reference to his notion of  good, see Lavecchia 2006, 199-202; Bontempi 2009, 210-224; 
Lavecchia 2010, 11-16.  
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any opposition to something bad, nor by a striving for self-assertion, nor by any 
norm or law, nor by any imperative or commandment, nor by any past experience 
or expectation regarding the future. In other words, the impulse we are 
delineating involves the unrestricted openness for the autonomy of  another being. 
Not surprisingly, according to Timaeus 34b6-8, the activity of  the Demiurge 
results in generating a cosmos characterized by complete autonomy – it needs, in 
fact, nothing external in order to maintain its own existence – and self-
consciousness (gnôrimon ... auton hautô). This is indeed the logical consequence of  
the unlimited generosity characterizing a good being: if  a good being would not be 
inclined to endow another being with its own freedom and autonomy, as a result 
its manifestation would be limited by some internal or external factor, that is it 
would be unable to be absolutely free from envy and hence unable to be 
unrestricted in its generosity.  
In this perspective the good implicates absolute gratuity, thus transcending 
any opposition between the self  and the other. The good consists namely in its 
manifestative character, that is, in the most generous form of  relationality, which 
involves unconditionally being open to and for the self-manifestation of  another 
being. In sum, the good would not be the good if  it did not implicate the most 
profound form of  self-transcendence7: if  it did not immediately transcend any 
opposition between identity and difference. 
 
 
3. The analogy between the sun and the supreme Good. The supreme Good as origin of  
being and consciousness 
 
Plato illustrates the eminently manifestative character of  the good through the 
famous analogy between the sun and the origin of  every being (Respublica 506d6-
509c). This origin Plato identifies with the supreme Good.  
For the following reason the sun appears as an absolutely convincing analogon 
of  the supreme Good: in the same way that the sun is unconceivable as separated 
from its manifestation through light, so the supreme Good is unconceivable as 
separated from its manifestation through being. Consequently, in Respublica 508d5 
the light generated by the sun is presented as analogous of  truth (alêtheia) and 
being, thus evidencing the immediate unity of  the Good with its manifestation, 
beyond any opposition between immanence and transcendence8. In this context 
we should therefore take at face value the etymology of  aletheia – a- privativum 
plus the same root of  lanthanô and lêthê –, which points at the quality of  being 
unhidden: truth – alêtheia – is the unhiddenness of  the Good. As a result, in 
                                                 
7 With regard to self-transcendence as intrinsic characteristic in Plato’s notion of  good see 
Lavecchia 2013a. 
8 Concerning this characteristic of  the supreme Good see Ferrari 2001, 14-15, 18, 22-24, 26-27, 
36-37; Lavecchia 2010, 43-55. 
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accordance with the literal meaning of  idea – originally designating what can be 
seen (idein) with regard to a certain being, – in Plato’s analogy of  the sun we 
should interpret the association of  the term idea with the supreme manifestation 
of  the Good( for example in Respublica 505a2, 508e2-3, 517b8-c1) as indicating 
that the Good makes itself  unconditionally knowable, visible, manifest through its 
idea. That is to say, the idea tou agathou (the Form of  the Good), that is the 
supreme form of  being, has to be intended as the unrestricted visibility or as the 
unhiddenness (alêtheia) of  the Good resulting from its unconfined self-givingness9. 
The unrestrictedness of  this visibility involves, in turn, the highest autonomy of  
being from its origin, that is: the inherence of  autonomous consciousness in the 
highest form of  being. The analogy between the Good and the sun indicates, in 
fact, that at its supreme level of  manifestation being does not presuppose any 
separation from consciousness. As Socrates explains, the relation connecting the 
sun with sight (with the eye) and the visible beings is namely analogous to the 
relation connecting the Good with the highest intellect (nous) and the 
intelligible/noetic beings (Respublica 508b12-c2). This implicates that the Good 
manifests itself  in its supreme form – in the form of  intelligible/noetic reality – as 
unity of  (we could say) objective being and subjective consciousness (intellect), in 
the same way as the sun manifests itself  as objective visibility as well as subjective 
activity of  perception (seeing). This corresponds entirely to the notion of  being 
good explicated basing on the Timaeus: the being good of  the Demiurge consists 
in an unrestricted self-givingness generating a being which is not only an objective 
image of  the Demiurge (92c7), but also an autonomous subjectivity, that is a self-
consciousness (34b7-8) capable of  perceiving and knowing the origin of  its 
generation.  
 
 
4. Explicating the unity of  being and consciousness in the supreme Good: the infinite 
sphere of  intelligible light  
 
On this platonic perspective, as illustrated through the analogy between the Good 
and the sun, the supreme Good does not generate a merely objective being: the 
being supremely manifesting the Good is an autonomous self, an autonomous 
consciousness, that is an intellect (nous) able to immediately perceive and manifest 
the intelligible, objective light of  the Good. Plato does not offer any conceptual 
explication for this unity of  being and consciousness in the supreme manifestation 
of  the Good. However, we can attempt an explication based on some clues which 
he gives in connection with the analogy between the Good and the sun. The first 
                                                 
9 On the appropriateness of  differentiating the idea tou agathou (the supreme manifestation of  
the Good) from the Good beyond its manifestation (agathon epekeina tês ousias Respublica 509b), 
already considered by Schelling, see Lavecchia 2005; Lavecchia 2006, 110-118; Lavecchia 2010, 
43-55.  
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clue consists in the fact that Plato perceives the Good as generator not only of  
intelligible reality, but also of  visible light as well as of  the sun (Respublica 508b12-
13, 517c3-4). This implicates that we have to consider the notion of  
intelligible/noetic light – which permeates the analogy between the Good and the 
sun (Respublica 508d4-6) – not as a mere metaphor based on the experience of  
visible light, but as indicating the true light, that is the spiritual 
(intelligible/noetic) light of  the highest being emanating from the Good10. Of  this 
light visible light has therefore to be regarded as an authentic image. 
Consequently, the Good reveals itself  – in accordance with its unconditional, 
infinite impulse to self-manifestation – as an original center emanating intelligible 
light, that is light transcending space and time.  
If  we now closely consider the Good as an original center of  intelligible light, 
we will be capable of  finding an explanation for the unity of  being and 
consciousness denoting the supreme manifestation of  the Good. An original center 
of  intelligible light implicates immediate identity with an infinite sphere of  light, 
which that center generates instantly because it transcends time and space. An 
original center of  intelligible light is therefore its own instant exteriorization in an 
infinite sphere, which implicates the fact that the center does not precede the 
sphere or vice versa. The just indicated exteriorization, in turn, does not result in 
an indefinite sphere. In fact, if  we concentrate on the infinity characterizing its 
impulse to self-manifestation, at infinity the exteriorization of  the original center 
manifests a limit consisting in its reversion, that is in an interiorization. In other 
words, the instant, spherical and infinite self-manifestation (exteriorization) of  
the original center (of  the Good) results in an immediate interiorization, which 
constitutes the plurality of  points building the circumference of  the infinite, but 
definite sphere generated by the original center. This reversion can be explained 
through the fact that the exteriorization, the objectivation of  the original center 
(of  the Good) is unrestricted and unconditional. As a consequence, it is completely 
undetermined by its identity, by its being exteriorization and objectivation, hence 
manifesting itself  immediately as unity with its opposite – with interiorization, 
subjectivity and consciousness. 
In this context the points building the circumference of  the intelligible sphere 
have to be considered as autonomous centers of  intelligible consciousness 
manifesting the Good as the original center of  intelligible consciousness, that is, as 
supreme intellect. Considering the strict analogy between the activity of  the sun 
regarding sight and the activity of  the Good regarding intelligible consciousness 
(Respublica 508b12-c2), the aforementioned centers of  intelligible consciousness 
correspond to the centers of  sight generated by the light of  the sun, that is to the 
eyes. The faculty of  sight and, accordingly, the essence of  the eye, is characterized 
                                                 
10 With regard to Plato’s notion of  intelligible light see Beierwaltes 1957, 37-98 for an 
exposition which is still unsurpassed. 
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by Plato this way – and this is the second clue to the explanation we are 
attempting – as generated through the interiorization of  the light exteriorized by 
the sun (Respublica 508a9-b11). Following the analogy with the Good, this process 
has to be perceived as mirroring the dynamic generated by the Good through its 
manifestation as original center of  intelligible light: it is, in fact, the visible 
equivalent of  the intelligible manifestation originated by the Good and consisting 
in the polarity of  intelligible subject (intellect) and intelligible objects11. This 
equivalence implicates the congruity of  the explications here attempted with 
reference to the infinite sphere of  intelligible light – notwithstanding the fact that 
Plato does not refer explicitly to that sphere12 –: just as the exteriorization of  the 
sun reverses and interiorizes itself  in the faculty of  sight, generating a plurality of  
eyes, so the exteriorization of  the Good reverses and interiorizes itself  instantly in 
a plurality of  centers characterized by autonomous intelligible consciousness and 
perception. Further, in the same way that the sun can be perceived as generating a 
visible sphere of  light whose circumference is constituted by the eyes, the Good 
can be perceived as instantly generating an infinite intelligible sphere of  light 
whose circumference is built by autonomous centers of  intelligible perception, 
that is, by autonomous centers of  consciousness.  
 
 
5. The life of  the intelligible sphere as supreme paradigm of  morality.  
 
Examining the sphere of  intelligible light with special regard to the dynamic 
connecting its components to each other, we will discover some stimulating 
implications to which Plato’s notion of  supreme Good could be pointing.  
Since intelligible light transcends space and time, the components of  the 
sphere generated by the Good cannot be considered as separated from each other 
through the presence of  something residing between them. Therefore, in the 
intelligible sphere every point building the circumference is not separated from the 
original center, so that every point belonging to the circumference is center and 
the whole sphere is constituted only by the points building its circumference: the 
center is everywhere and the circumference nowhere13. However, the hereby 
                                                 
11 See the strict analogy between nous kai ta noumena and opsis kai ta horômena in Respublica 
508b12-c2. 
12 This absence of  explicit reference could explain why nobody has until now attempted to 
integrate into their explication of  the analogy of  the sun an interpretation of  the sphere of  
intelligible light. In any case, the integration proposed here is legitimized by the fact that 
Socrates declares his having omitted many things during the explication of  the analogy (Resp. 
509c9-10). One of  these many things is exactly the explanation concerning the unity of  being 
and consciousness to which the analogy clearly points. Without reference to the sphere of  
intelligible light this aspect of  the analogy would remain simply incomprehensible.  
13 This formulation is attested in Liber XXIV Philosophorum II (Deus est sphaera infinita cuius 
centrum est ubique, circumferentia nusquam), which contains the first explicit reference to the 
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presupposed unity of  the original center with every other point of  the sphere is 
not to be intended as a static, mathematical coincidence, which would imply a 
spatial connotation of  it. On the contrary, this unity has to be perceived as a 
dynamic reciprocal transparency instantly and immediately connecting each other 
all components of  the sphere14. The resultant relation subsisting among those 
components can be imagined as rhythm and harmony deriving from an eternal (id 
est, non-spatial and non-temporal) pulsation, through which every component, by 
manifesting its self-consciousness, immediately manifests the self-conscious 
transparency of  every other component. 
Commensurate with these considerations, Plato’s notion of  supreme Good 
points to the fact that the being immediately manifesting the Good cannot be 
considered as an abstractly universal, impersonal reality, but should be perceived 
as a dynamic, harmonious community: as a cosmos of  intelligible beings, in which 
every individual being manifests instantly the whole community as well as every 
other individual by transparently manifesting its own autonomous individuality 
and consciousness. Certainly, the 'cosmos' as I understand it here is very far from 
the picture currently delineated by exegetes of  Plato with regard to the 
intelligible world, according to which picture Plato’s Forms are purely abstract, 
universal entities not characterized by autonomous consciousness and morality15. 
This current picture is indeed problematic in twofold respect: on the one hand it 
does not take seriously enough the relation intimately connecting the Forms with 
the Good, which – being the origin of  the Forms as well as the supreme Form – 
has unquestionably to be perceived as endowing the Forms with its own qualities, 
that is – with its own impulse to unconditional relationality; on the other hand it 
takes into little or no account the fact that in Respublica 500c2-5 the intelligible 
world is in fact characterized as the supreme paradigm of  justice and kosmos, that 
is as a perfectly harmonious and ordered complex of  relations, which reveals it as 
the supreme expression of  virtue (see also Phaedrus 247d5-6). In addition, 
interpreters assuming as valid the current picture are until now incapable of  
satisfactorily explaining away the identification of  the Demiurge with the 
supreme noetic (intelligible) being attested in Timaeus 37a1-2. If  taken seriously 
(and why should we not take it seriously?) this identification – that is, the 
identification with the Form of  the Good16 – would document clearly the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
aforementioned property characterizing the infinite sphere. Concerning the history of  this 
image see Mahnke 1937; Hedwig 1980.  
14 The notion of  reciprocal transparency is explicitly related to the intelligible beings in 
Plotinus Enn. V 8 (31), 4, 6-7, where it is associated with the self-transparency of  intelligible 
light. Although Plotinus does not mention explicitly the intelligible sphere of  light, the 
aforementioned passage can be explained entirely through reference to it.  
15 On the necessity of  attributing self-consciousness to the Forms see the brilliant exposition in 
Schwabe 2001 (with further bibliography).  
16 The identification of  the Demiurge with the Form of  the Good – which in the perspective 
delineated here would imply the identification with the supreme intellect – is affirmed, for 
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inherence of  consciousness and morality in the intelligible world, revealing the 
intelligible world as the highest manifestation of  the identity between being, 
consciousness and morality implicit in Plato’s notion of  supreme Good and 
manifested by the analogy of  the sun17.  
On this basis the explication of  the infinite sphere offered above (§ 4.), 
combined with Plato’s perception of  the supreme Good as well as of  the 
intelligible world, could help to delineate a coherent picture. In the resultant 
picture the supreme Good appears – because of  its unconditional relationality – 
on the one side as transcending any notion of  unity and plurality18, of  
universality and individuality, of  objectivity and subjectivity, of  identity and 
difference, on the other side as originating a reality characterized by the most 
intimate unity of  being and consciousness. This reality, in turn, manifests itself  
immediately as a cosmos, that is as a complex of  harmonious, transparent 
relations between autonomous centers of  intelligible consciousness. This spiritual 
cosmos is, according to Plato, supreme paradigm and source of  both individual 
and public morality (Respublica 500b7-501c3).  
In consonance with this background, morality results solidly anchored in the 
ultimate origin of  being. In the supreme Good are, in fact, anchored on the same 
level, a configuration of  being immediately manifesting morality as well as the 
consciousness and conscience capable of  autonomously revealing that 
configuration. This anchorage can be vividly illustrated through the infinite 
sphere of  intelligible light, of  which the Good is the original center. The unity of  
being and consciousness characterizing this sphere can be perceived, in reality, as 
immediately manifesting morality, since that unity instantly reveals itself  as a 
                                                                                                                                                                  
example, in Stumpf  1869, 232-243; Zeller 1889, 507-518; Wood 1968; Benitez 1995; Seifert 2001; 
Lavecchia 2005, 14-19; Lavecchia 2006, 216-222 (with further bibliography). The importance of  
this identification with reference to some seminal problems arising from Plato’s philosophy is 
rightly acknowledged in Rist 2012, 232-235 and 252, although according to Rist – who does not 
attribute adequate significance to Timaeus 37a1-2 – for Plato the identity of  the Demiurge with 
both the supreme intellect and the Form of  the Good remains only conjectural. 
17 The identity of  Demiurge and highest intelligible being obviously involves the identity of  the 
Demiurge with the model of  his activity, that is, with the intelligible world – since the highest 
noetic being embraces in itself  all other noetic beings (Timaeus 30c7-8). In turn, this implicates 
that the relationality peculiar of  the intelligible world has to be intended as unrestricted also ad 
extra. This is not contradicted by the fact that Plato often emphasizes the transcendence of  the 
intelligible world with regard to the visible universe, since he never characterizes this 
transcendence as hindering an impulse to self-givingness.  
18 In this perspective the two supreme principles of  being attested in the so-called agrapha 
dogmata – the One and the Indefinite Dyad – could be interpreted as explicating the fact that 
the Good is supreme principle both of  unity and plurality, whereas the Good transcends every 
form of  both unity – that is the One – and plurality – the Indefinite Dyad. If  this 
interpretation is right, Plato could not be considered as progenitor of  the neoplatonic henology, 
which, in turn, would in this case depend on an univocal interpretation of  Plato’s protology. 
Regarding these subjects see Lavecchia 2010; Lavecchia 2012, 23-31; Lavecchia 2013.  
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transparent complex of  harmonious relations between autonomous centers of  
intelligible consciousness, whose life supremely manifests the self-givingness of  the 
Good. In other words, an immediate and conscious relation with the Good can be 
perceived, in this perspective, as the substance of  intelligible/noetic life. Being 
consciousness intrinsically manifesting intelligible life, intellect (nous), in its both 
divine and human instantiations, should therefore not be regarded as a faculty 
exclusively producing abstractions or formalisms. On the contrary, the authentic 
nature of  its activity, that is, of  thinking, resides, according to this perspective, in 
autonomously generating relations manifesting the Good through a direct insight 
into the Good self19. As a consequence, in this activity every gap separating 
knowledge and morality is definitely transcended, since true knowledge consists 
for Plato in the acquaintance with and in the manifestation of  the Good.  
True knowledge resides, from Plato’s point of  view, beyond the polarity of  
theory/contemplation and practice/application20, in the same way that the life of  
the intelligible sphere resides beyond the polarity of  self  and other. In other words, 
true knowledge is an activity imagining and generating new instantiations of  the 
transparent, eternal rhythm and harmony constituting the life of  the intelligible 
sphere21, in which every center of  consciousness generates itself  through being 
unrestrictedly open to and for the transparency of  and communion with every 
other center of  consciousness. In the aforementioned, eminently moral activity 
consists the genuine nature of  thinking, which, according to the dynamic which 
characterizes the intelligible sphere, originally manifests itself  as production of  
the sphericity, that is of  the unconditional relationality building that sphere. On 
Plato’s perspective human persons are capable of  generating autonomously and 
intentionally that – both intellectual and moral – activity if  they connect 
themselves consciously with the authentic essence of  their being. The unshakeable 
confidence in this potentiality explains why Plato perceives authentic morality as 
presupposing a constant orientation towards the activity of  intellect, through 
which that essence manifests itself  in the supreme form. This orientation, in turn, 
does not implicate the abstract intellectualism often attributed to Plato’s or 
Socrates’ ethics. It points, conversely, to the self-givingness which led Socrates to 
sacrifice his life because of  encouraging his fellow citizens to become persons 
autonomously, that is: consciously manifesting the Good22.  
                                                 
19 Plato evidences the intrinsic relation with the Good as characterizing the nature of  intellect, 
for example, in Phaedo 97c5-6, 98a7-b3, 99a7-b2 and c1-6; Respublica 508b12-c2; Philebus 
67a10-12.  
20 For an exemplary take on this aspect of  Plato’s philosophy see Festugière 1950, 373-447 and 
Krämer 1959. 
21 Not surprisingly, in Leges 689d sophia is strictly connected with the concept of  symphônia, 
indicating the harmonious integration of  many voices. For a general exposition concerning 
Plato’s notion of  sophia, with particular attention to its relation with the supreme Good, see 
Lavecchia 2009. 
22 Concerning Socrates’ self-givingness, that is – the absence of  envy, see the significant 
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6. Manifesting the good as experience of  genuine freedom: harmonizing individuality 
and community 
 
In consonance with our previous considerations Plato’s notion of  good cannot be 
intended as primarily referring to the concept of  end or goal (telos), which solely 
implicates a reference to a being or a state/condition external to the person 
striving for attaining the good. In Plato’s perspective good indicates, rather, 
primarily the fundamental, constitutional attitude of  a self  capable of  
consciously actualizing the most generous relation with regard to another self  or 
to a plurality of  selves, enabling another self  or a plurality of  selves to manifest 
unconditionally and autonomously their genuine nature. Of  course Plato intends 
the good also as telos, as some seminal passages in his dialogues clearly indicate23. 
However, this telos does not consist in a merely passive state of  contemplation 
related to some irrevocably transcendent object. On the contrary, the philosophical 
itinerary proposed by Plato culminates in a productive union with the supreme 
reality, which results in activity autonomously generating new instantiations of  
morality and knowledge (Symposiun 212a3-5 and Respublica 490b1-7).  
The radical transcendence of  the supreme Good with regard to every form of  
being, evoked in Respublica 509b8-10 – the Good is epekeina tês ousias – does not 
contradict this perspective just delineated. Conversely, if  the Good did not 
transcend every form of  being then it would follow that the self-givingness of  the 
Good would be determined and limited by the coincidence with a form of  being. 
This coincidence, in fact, would make it impossible for the Good to endow another 
being with real autonomy, which implicates real alterity, that is independent 
ontological substantiality on the side of  the being originated by the Good. In sum, 
transcendence results in this context as prerequisite of  freedom, both for the Good 
and for its manifestation. On this basis the manifestation of  the Good cannot be 
intended as reflection or reproduction of  some identity, but reveals itself  as 
generation of  new forms of  autonomy, that is as creativity24. And this pertains not 
only to the supreme manifestation of  the Good self, but also to the activity of  
every self-intending to manifest the Good. In order to realize its intention, that is, 
in order to directly experience and reveal the Good, that self  has to transcend 
every form of  being, becoming thus capable of  manifesting a really new form of  
being, not deducible from other forms of  being. The self-willing to manifest the 
Good has, in other words, to re-generate in a new form the unrestricted freedom of  
                                                                                                                                                                  
passages in Euthyphro 3d6-8 and Apologia 33a6-b3.  
23 See, for instance, the explicit assertions in Gorgias 499e7-500a1 and Respublica 505d11-e1.  
24 For an attempt at illuminating Plato’s notion of  good in reference to the notion of  creativity 
see Lavecchia 2012a. 
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the Good25. Nevertheless, the thus attained freedom has nothing to do with 
arbitrariness, but consists in infinite openness to the most generous relation with 
regard to and for the autonomy of  other beings or selves. This freedom implicates, 
in sum, primarily freedom from one’s own self. This freedom is the most radical 
form of  self-transcendence. It cannot therefore be intended as unilateral 
subjectivity; on the contrary, this form of  freedom is unconditionally receptive to 
the most transparent manifestation of  alterity. In fact, it gives to another self, to 
other persons, and, in general, to other beings – as already mentioned – the 
possibility of  entirely revealing their genuine nature.  
To the same source of  freedom refers the passage of  the Politicus (294a6-b6) 
evidencing the superiority over any norm or law with regard to the person who 
has achieved true knowledge. This superiority, in fact, does not implicate any sort 
of  anomic attitude, but the capacity of  actively generating harmonious relations 
with the world and with other persons, drawing the substance of  those relations 
from the supreme source of  any law and rule as well as of  any being, that is from 
the supreme Good. The passage from the Politicus points, accordingly, to an 
eminently situational ethics, which, basing on a direct experience of  the supreme 
Good, considers as prime concern the individuality of  the context in which the 
good has to be manifested26. However, this does not involve striving for anarchy, 
since Plato’s ethics lives in intimate relation with an ontology which, originated in 
the experience of  the supreme Good, gives autonomy and individuality a 
preeminently relational, that is moral, connotation. In the light of  this ontology 
autonomy and individuality actually manifest themselves authentically through 
showing the same self-givingness characterizing the Good, that is the reality 
which, on Plato’s account, ultimately originates their very being. On this basis 
Plato’s ethics can be perceived as per se harmonizing free individuality and 
community: if  free individuality actualizes itself  through manifestation of  self-
givingness, in consequence its nature reveals itself  as intrinsically generating 
communion, that is as intrinsically creating harmony within a community. 
The point of  view just characterized implicates that the good cannot be 
manifested exclusively based on the past, ie. through exclusive instantiation of  
exterior or interior norms deduced from past experiences. This form of  proceeding 
would bias the encounter with the individuality of  persons as well as with the 
specificity of  situations. Conversely, in this perspective the good can become most 
originally manifest starting from the future which can be initiated through 
unprejudiced and competent observation of  the present: through creative 
formativity27, not through the monarchy of  formalized procedures. The contrary 
                                                 
25 From this point of  view it becomes comprehensible why Plato portrays the authentic 
philosopher as manifesting the highest form of  freedom (Theaetetus 172d3-176a1).  
26 In contrast, no norm or law is capable of  mirroring that individuality, since it is always based 
on generalizations (see 294a10-c6), that is on abstractions. 
27 On the possibility of  connecting Luigi Pareyson’s concept of  formatività (Pareyson 1988) to 
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would implicate here both annihilating any form of  true knowledge and making 
life unlivable, as the brilliant depiction of  degenerate normativity in Politicus 
294d4-297b4, 297e8-299e effectively emphasizes. Authentic manifestation of  the 
good, that is, genuine morality and virtue, involves, in other words, the 
willingness to bring a new birth into the world (Symposium 212a2-5), in the same 
way that, as indicated by Socrates’ acting as midwife, a new birth is presupposed 
in order to attain true knowledge (Theaetetus 149a-151d3)28. In this context 
Socrates’ midwifery reveals itself  as exemplary with regard to the achievement 
not only of  epistemic truth, but also of  moral truth. This is not surprising, since 
every act of  true knowledge consists, from Plato’s viewpoint, in a direct or 
indirect relation with the supreme Good – with the origin of  every truth 
(Respublica 508e1-4) – thus manifesting itself  as eminently moral act.  
In consonance with this perspective, both epistemic and moral acts have 
ultimately to be based on unrestricted confidence in the individuality of  the acting 
person(s) as well as of  their context.29 This is the same unconditional confidence 
required by the event of  a birth, where, notwithstanding her expertise, the 
midwife is never able to deduce from past experience the singularity and 
uniqueness either of  the newborn, of  the mother, and of  the actual situation 
concomitant with the birth. In accordance with Plato’s notion of  supreme Good, 
this confidence appears as the ultimate ground of  genuinely good choices. In other 
words, the supreme Good can never be authentically manifested on the basis of  
fear with respect to personal autonomy and responsibility, delegating freedom and 
responsibility to formal or bureaucratic procedures. Manifesting the supreme 
Good presupposes, on the contrary, the courage of  imagining genuinely 
unrestricted, creative freedom: the courage of  realizing that very unconditional 
generosity through which the Good originally gave birth to beings intrinsically 
endowed with autonomous consciousness and personal responsibility.  
 
 
7. Agathological realism 
 
The implications contained in Plato’s notion of  supreme Good could enable a 
configuration of  a realism capable of  transcending any sterile opposition not only 
between subjectivity and objectivity, but also between ontology and ethics. In 
accordance with these implications, moral and ontological reality cannot, in fact, 
be separated, since in the light of  the Good the original nature of  being manifests 
itself  as autonomous consciousness characterized by acting through unrestricted 
self-givingness, that is, by acting in an eminently moral form. As a consequence, 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Plato’s notion of  the good, see Lavecchia 2012a. 
28 For a valuable introduction to the context presenting the characterization of  Socrates’ 
midwifery see Sedley 2004. 
29 Stimulating considerations on Plato’s notion of  confidence can be found in Bontempi 2013. 
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ontology does not prevail over ethics or vice versa: both are anchored on the same 
level in the unconditional relationality of  the Good. In sum, the here emphasized 
unity of  ontology and ethics, of  being and morality, neither involves a 
predetermination of  being through an univocally prescriptive morality nor implies 
an original delimitation of  morality through an univocally objective being. In the 
light of  the Good both being and morality are intrinsic manifestations of  a 
consciousness which, because of  its unrestricted self-givingness, generates the 
highest form of  freedom and creativity, concomitantly generating the most 
harmonious form of  relation and communion. On this perspective thinking is 
originally the activity which, on the one side, manifests, and on the other side 
perceives the generativeness just indicated as well as the relations and the 
harmonious order produced by it. In other words, thinking transcends the 
Kantian distinction between practical and pure (theoretical) reason30. Being 
anchored in the Good, conceptual activity reveals itself  therefore as both 
productive imagination and active contemplation of  good relations: it concretely 
perceives the reality as well as the ultimate origin of  those relations, at the same 
time being immediately capable of  generating new instantiations of  that reality31.  
In accordance with these considerations, conceptual and moral realism32 could 
persuasively attain a common foundation based on the important suggestions 
derivable from Plato’s notion of  supreme Good. This common foundation of  
conceptual and moral reality could give a solution to the many aporias resulting 
                                                 
30 Obviously, distinction does not mean opposition or dualism, as Kant’s constant attempt to 
achieve a synthesis between these two dimensions of  reason demonstrates. In the light of  the 
foregoing discussion concerning the unity of  being and consciousness in the Good, an 
unprejudiced investigation of  Kant’s so-called Opus Postumum could be extraordinarily 
stimulating and illuminating. Dieter Henrich’s masterly considerations regarding Kant’s 
concept of  ethical autonomy (Henrich 2001, 6-42) properly affirms the impossibility of  
returning, after Kant, to an interpretation of  morality univocally based on the concept of  telos-
entelecheia. This interpretation would namely incorrectly bypass Kant’s intense consideration of  
the fact that only a real presence of  the good in the morally acting consciousness/self  (bonitas 
solae voluntatis) on the one hand, and only the possibility of  founding the relation with the good 
in that consciousness/self  on the other hand, is capable of  authentically grounding ethical 
autonomy (Henrich 2001, 40-41). According to Henrich, this connects Kant with perspectives 
peculiar of  Plato’s philosophy (Henrich 2001, 41-42). This is in general true, if  we only except 
the fact that Kant always – including his latest elaborations – formulates his concept of  
authentic moral action by ultimately recurring to the notion of  law (Gesetz). In Plato’s 
agathological perspective, on the contrary, the primary concern of  supremely moral action does 
not reside in the possibility of  its being universalized, but in its impulse to creatively configuring 
relations which are able to manifest the singularity of  every situation.  
31 Consequently, this perspective has to be differentiated from Kenneth Gergen’s social 
constructivism as well as from the resulting concept of  relational being. According to Gergen the 
self  is, in fact, a whole that is equal to the sum of  the relations in which it is embedded (Gergen 
2009, 55), not a creator of  authentically new relations. 
32  A recent valuable attempt at grounding a conceptual realism can be found in Mulder 2014. 
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from the separation between theoretical and practical philosophy as well as 
between ontology and ethics. Plato’s notion of  supreme Good, in fact, transcends 
that separation, since it grounds both knowledge/perception and morality in the 
very same gesture of  self-givingness. To this assertion could be certainly objected 
through many more or less stringent arguments. Nevertheless, no objection is 
capable of  obliterating the phenomenal experience we can observe in association 
with our activity of  perceiving and knowing: on the one hand we would perceive 
and know no really other being if  we would not generate an unlimited space of  
manifestation for its reality, that is if  we would not be unconditionally open for its 
birth in our perception and knowledge; on the other hand no perception or 
knowledge would be possible if  being would not be in a certain way 
unconditionally open for the birth of  our perception and knowledge. This points to 
a real reciprocal self-givingness connecting ourselves with the world or with other 
selves. Without that self-givingness I would remain confined in my interiority, and 
the world in its exteriority33: were myself  as well as every other being incapable of  
manifesting a certain level of  self-givingness, no form of  real perception or 
knowledge would be possible.On this perspective, that is, on a platonic 
perspective, authentic morality reveals itself  as the most conscious and active 
form of  perception and knowledge, of  which every other form of  perception and 
knowledge can be considered a more or less authentic image. This does not imply a 
subordination of  morality to knowledge, since in this same perspective true 
perception and knowledge, in turn, can be actualized solely because of  the moral 
constitution peculiar of  being. Summing up: in this agathological perspective 
morality and knowledge reciprocally generate their reality, thus instantiating that 
creative unity of  interiority and exteriority, of  being and consciousness, of  
individuality and community, of  freedom and responsibility, which is immediately 
implied in the ultimate origin of  every reality, that is in the supreme Good. 
Accordingly, neither morality nor knowledge could be authentically founded on 
the basis of  a realism univocally concentrating either on moral or on conceptual 
realities. This would indicate the necessity of  an agathological realism, willing to 
consider the reality of  the good as the primary concern of  philosophy, on which the 
possibility of  a both moral and conceptual realism does depend. As the foregoing 
discussion hopefully indicated, this willingness, in turn, would imply the courage 
of  thinking and experiencing the good as originally transcending many 
reapresentations we currently associate with it. Plato’s notion of  supreme Good 
may give us valuable help on the way of  attaining that courage: the courage 
leading Socrates to sacrifice his life for helping others to generate authentic 
knowledge and morality. 
 
 
                                                 
33 For an introduction to the concept of  perception and knowledge as transcending the 
opposition of  exteriority and interiority see Scheurle 2013. 
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